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Abstract 
This  paper  considers  the  Greenspan/Summers/IMF  (GSI)  argument  that  the 
Asian way of doing business was the deep cause of the Asian crisis.  The IMF 
reform programme for the crisis-affected Asian countries suggested they should 
abandon the Asian business model and adopt the US corporate model. The main 
findings are: a) contrary to GSI doctrine, poor corporate governance and lack of 
competition are not common characteristics of the Asian business model; b) that 
the stock-market based US business model has severe limitations for developing 
country  corporations,  not  least  because  of  imperfect  share  prices  and  the 
imperfect market for corporate control. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
Corporate governance has attracted significant attention in developing countries 
only since the Asian crisis of 1997-1999. Arguably, this crisis and its analysis 
by leading US officials and by the IMF introduced it as a key issue on the 
international development agenda. 
 
The  Asian  crisis  came  as  a  great  shock  to  the  international  economic 
establishment.  Countries  with  solid  long-term  records  of  fast  growth, 
acknowledged  as  being  fiscally  responsible  and  to  have  good  economic 
management were now faced with an unprecedented crisis, a virtual meltdown.
1 
At the beginning, there was some advanced country interest in reforming the 
world economic and financial system in order to stop the recurrence of such 
crises.
2 Soon this concern evaporated as advanced countries (ACs) realised that 
there  had  not  been  any  serious  adverse  spill-over  effects  on  their  own 
economies. Instead, leading U.S. officials (the then Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, Alan Greenspan (1998), and the then Under-Secretary of the Treasury, 
Larry Summers (1998b)) as well as the IMF (1997, 1998a, 1998b) put forward a 
‘structural theory’ of economic crisis in the Asian countries. They argued that 
the crisis may have been triggered by certain macroeconomic imbalances but 
that the fundamental causes were rooted in the deficient institutional structures 
of these economies. The latter were said to manifest themselves in the day-to-
day  microeconomic  behaviour  of  households  and  corporations  in  these 




The most important defects of the Asian way were regarded as follows: (a) poor 
corporate  governance,  (b)  poor  state  of  competition,  (c)  close  relationship 
between government, business and banks, which was termed as indicating crony 
capitalism. The essential argument of the Greenspan-Summers-IMF thesis (GSI 
thesis) was that poor corporate governance mechanisms and poor competition as 
well as crony capitalism enabled Asian firms to disregard profits in their pursuit 
of market share, leading to over-investment which in turn generated a crisis 
(due to excess supply and the consequent fall in profitability). In view of the 
close  relationship between  businesses  and  banks  and  the  government,  a  few 
leading families were able to control corporate assets on a vast scale through 
various legal and financial devices. The large Asian conglomerates also had 
high debt-equity ratios that made them vulnerable to external economic shocks 
(to the extent that their debt was denominated in foreign currency). 
 
On  the  basis  of  this  analysis,  IMF  economists  recommended  changes  in 
fundamental institutions of the crisis-affected countries. Essentially, developing 
countries were advised to abandon the Asian business model and adopt in its   2 
place the US model based on shareholders’ wealth maximization subject to the 
discipline of liquid stock markets. Thus, they were expected to change their 
institutions of corporate governance, their labour laws, financial system based 
on  ‘relationship  lending’  and,  more  generally,  the  nature  of  the  relationship 
between government, business and finance. In  the IMF view, its advocacy of a 
US-type model was based  on the ostensible superior ability of such a model to 
allocate resources and monitor corporate behaviour. 
 
This paper provides a critique of the GSI critique of the Asian way of doing 
business.  It  also  offers  a  critical  analysis  of  the  US  corporate  model  and 
suggests that it is not only unsuitable for DC economies but, arguably, also 
inappropriate for the US economy itself. 
 
The negative GSI view of the Asian business model has very recently been 
given  a  more  solid  base  by  theoretical  and  empirical  research  on  corporate 
governance and crony capitalism (Morck et. al., 2005). Furthermore, the latter 
authors extend the GSI propositions by demonstrating that the questions at issue 
are not just microeconomic but also have major macroeconomic implications 
for the whole economy.  These authors link this research with their theoretical 
and  empirical  critique  of  the  seminal  work  of  La  Porta  et  al  (1998,  2000) 
(LLSV) on law, finance and development. The implications of these analyses 
for  corporate  governance  and  for  the  broader  issues  of  economic  growth  in 
developing countries are also discussed. In view of its importance for the main 
themes of this paper, this new literature is reviewed in Section 2. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  3  reviews  the  main 
features  of  Asian  model  of  corporate  governance,  law,  and  finance  in  its 
idealized form on the basis of practice in Japan (during the period 1950-1973 
when  it  resembled  a  developing  country)  and  Korea.  Section  4  reviews 
empirical evidence on whether or not corporate governance and deficiencies in 
the  system  of  corporate  finance  have  been  the  sources  of  economic  crises, 
particularly the Asian crisis. This section also examines empirical evidence on 
issues relating to crony capitalism and the Asian crisis and suggests that there is 
no robust evidence for linking the two. Section 5 examines the main merits of 
the stock market based US business model as well as noting its shortcomings. 
Section 6 has a brief conclusion. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to bring together the several different 
literatures on corporate governance, finance, law, institutions and development 
so as to examine recently available empirical evidence concerning corporate 
governance, competition and crony capitalism in emerging markets. The latter 
includes the author’s own recent collaborative research (Glen, Lee and Singh,   3 
2003, Glen and Singh, 2005a, 2005b). Analyses of IMF policy programmes 
during the Asian crisis have been mainly been concerned with traditional micro- 
and  macroeconomic  policy  recommendations.  The  present  critique  is  more 
fundamental and relates to the institutional engineering advocated by the IMF. 
In addition, it provides a stringent analysis of the almost universally acclaimed 
US business model. The paper further contributes by linking these literatures 
directly to the international policy agenda on development. 
 
2. Corporate governance, crony capitalism and wider institutional analysis 
In  a  recent  important  contribution  Morck  et  al  (2005)  greatly  extend  GSI’s 
critique of corporate governance and crony capitalism in Asian countries. They 
argue theoretically, as well as on the basis of empirical evidence, that crony 
capitalism  has  far  wider  economic  implications  than  is  implied  in  the  GSI 
analysis. Morck et al define crony capitalism in terms of the control exerted 
over a large part of a country’s corporate assets that are held by a small group of 
families. The ownership of assets by the latter is typically much smaller than the 
extent of their control due to the use of pyramidal control structures, cross-
shareholdings, super-voting rights and similar devices. In many countries this 
leads to high concentration of control of the country’s resources in the hands of 
a  few  families.  In  principle,  this  allows  the  controlling  families  not  only  to 
influence economic processes at the micro level but also to exert influence over 
the country’s overall economic and political processes. In theoretical terms this 
means that institutional development in terms of property rights and protection 
of minority shareholders become endogenous variables. This is in contrast to 
LLSV who consider legal origins (which is their primary determining variable 
of the corporate legal system) to be an exogenous variable.  
 
This formulation enables Morck et al (2005) to resolve some of the well-known 
anomalies arising in the LLSV legal origin analysis, such as the inability of the 
latter research to provide an explanation for what Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
call the ‘great reversals’. For example, before the First World War the French 
stock market system was more developed than that in America, whereas now 
the situation is quite the reverse. The LLSV theory, because of its strong path 
dependence, is particularly unsuited to explaining changes in phenomena over 
time. 
 
Morck et al assert that, because dominant control rights are vested in families 
who often have little of their own capital invested, these ownership and control 
structures lead to problems at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. They 
argue  that,  at  the  micro-level,  this  situation  results  in  agency  problems,  and 
therefore  resource  misallocation.  At  a  macroeconomic  level,  it  leads  to  low 
innovation  rates,  economy-wide  resource  misallocation,  and  low  economic   4 
growth. It is further suggested that the influence of this controlling elite may 
distort public policy regarding the protection of property rights, regulation of 
capital markets, and other institutions 
 
Elite control over public policy can, however, lead either to policies that are 
unfavourable to the general public or to policies that advance social welfare. 
The  authors  term  the  former  as  ‘economic  entrenchment’  or  ‘oligarchic 
capitalism’, and the latter as ‘diffuse capitalism’ of the Anglo-Saxon variety. 
They suggest that the former can be a sub-optimal equilibrium. Further research 
is  needed  to  explore  the  political  economy  of  the  distribution  of  corporate 
control. 
 
Another point central to the vision of Morck et al is their orthodox view that 
asserts that freely functioning perfect capital markets constitute the best means 
to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources and are therefore the key to 
economic development. Thus they regard economic growth as being critically 
dependent on institutions that restrain entrenched elites, who might otherwise 
dominate the capital investment decisions of an economy to the detriment of the 
citizens. Morck et al’s line of reasoning suggests that as long as capital markets 
are not subverted by the controlling elite, but are allowed to function freely, 
they constitute the best means of achieving economic growth. 
 
This position may be contrasted to that of J. M. Keynes who was extremely 
critical of the capital investment decisions of an economy being left to a freely 
functioning stock market. As he put it, one should not be surprised that if the 
capital investment decisions of an economy are left to a gambling casino the job 
will be ill-done (Keynes, 1936). These contrasting views of the stock market are 
an important theme in this paper and are taken up in the last section.  
 
The Morck et al type of analysis extolling the virtues of free capital markets and 
also,  implicitly,  of  corporate  governance  of  professionally  managed  firms 
whose  shares  are  widely  held  has  underpinned  IMF  policy  programmes  for 
developing  countries  following  the  Asian  crisis.  It  is,  of  course,  also  a  key 
foundation of the US corporate model in its ideal form. It is important to note 
that Morck et al’s  representation of the virtues of the freely functioning stock 
market is an idealized picture and is only a “maintained hypothesis” not put to 
empirical  testing.  This  maintained  hypothesis  is  critically  examined  in  the 
second half of this paper both iin theoretical and empirical terms.   
   5 
3. The Asian Way of Doing Business 
It is useful at this point to outline the main differences between the Asian way 
of  doing  business  and  the  standard  US  business  model,  drawing  on  broad 
practice  in  Japan  between  1950  and  1973  and  in  Korea  before  financial 
liberalization in the early 1990s, which set the model for other Asian countries 
(Singh and Weisse, 1999; Singh, 1998b, 1999a).   
•  There  was  a  close  relationship  between  government  and  business  in 
which the government did little or nothing without consulting business 
and vice versa. Such close relationships were conducted through sectoral 
‘deliberation councils’ which were used to coordinate investment plans.  
Government  assistance  to  firms  was  linked  to  strict  performance 
standards regarding exports and technological standards (Amsden, 2001 
and Evans, 1987). 
•  Much government intervention was carried out by means of a system of 
‘administrative  guidance’  rather  than  through  formal  legislation  that 
required a certain degree of discretion and autonomy on the part of the 
senior  levels  of  the  civil  service.  The  latter  acted  as  guardians  of  the 
national interest to a much greater degree than did their counterparts in 
other industrializing countries such as Brazil (Chang, 1998).  
•  The relationship between corporations and the financial system - the so-
called  ‘main  bank’  system  -  involved  long-term  relationships  between 
firms and banks. This enabled Japanese or Korean managers to take a 
long-term view in their investment decisions. Hence, company managers 
were  not  constrained  by  the  threat  of  hostile  take-overs  as  occurs  in 
Anglo-Saxon countries (Aoki and Patrick, 1992, Odagiri, 1994). 
•  East Asian companies pursued internal practices that differed from those 
of US and UK companies, as, for example, maintaining a co-operative 
relationship between management and labour, epitomised by the system 
of lifetime employment. In orthodox terms this resulted in considerable 
imperfections in the labour market (Aoki, 1990; Dore, 1986). However, 
the cost of these imperfections were thought to be far outweighed by the 
gains obtained from such co-operative relations, including in particular 
the  willingness  of  workers  to  accept  technical  change  and  indeed  to 
actively  participate  at  enterprise  level  in  proposing  technical 
improvements (Best, 1990).  
•  Competition in product markets has not been regarded by the East Asian 
authorities as an unalloyed good: there was no dictum that “the more 
competition the better”. Rather East Asian governments took the view 
that, in promoting investment and technical change the optimal degree of 
competition was neither perfect competition nor maximum competition.   6 
Competition was therefore managed and guided in a purposeful manner. 
(Amsden and Singh, 1994).  
•  East Asian governments did not seek ‘close’ but what might be called 
‘strategic’ integration with the world economy. They integrated fully, for 
example, in relation to exports but much less so with respect to imports; 
fully regarding science and knowledge but much less so with respect to 
external finance and inward multinational investment (Chakravarty and 
Singh, 1988).  In other words, they integrated to the extent that it was 
useful for them to do so in building up their economy.  
•  Surveys of company managers in various Asian countries reveal that in 
East  Asia  managers  had  and  continue  to  have  rather  different  goals 
regarding company objectives than do those in Europe and in particular 
the US (Yoshimori, 1995; Allen, 2005). To illustrate, Yoshimori’s study 
found  that  only  3  per  cent  of  Japanese  corporate  managers  regarded 
shareholders’ interests as being paramount. 
 
Although  there  have  been  individual  country  specificities,  this  ’ideal  type’ 
Asian business model reflects a broad commonality of approach distinguishing 
it from the US business model. While in recent years there have been important 
changes  in  Asian  business  practice  due  to  liberalization  in  the  context  of 
globalization, there is, nevertheless, significant path persistence.  
 
Those who attribute the East Asian crisis to this Asian way of doing business 
are faced with two immediate difficult questions. First, to be convincing, their 
analysis  must  be  able  to  explain  not  just  the  failure  of  the  system,  but, 
importantly, its previous success. It should be able to explain why for example a 
model that, for so long, was able to generate sustained industrialization and 
historically  unprecedented  growth  yet  then  became  the  root  cause  of  a 
precipitate  and  devastating  economic  crisis.  Second,  if  the  crisis  is  to  be 
attributed to the Asian model it is incumbent on the critics of the Asian model to 
explain the suddenness of the financial and economic crash. It will be argued 
below that there is a more plausible explanation for the Asian crisis, which is 
also compatible with the known facts. 
 
4. The Asian model and its critics: learning truth from facts 
This section presents an appraisal of the influential GSI critique of the Asian 
way of doing business that formed the basis of IMF policy recommendations. 
As the IMF (1998b) noted that its programmes and policy advice to the Asian 
crisis countries placed particular emphasis on “wide-ranging structural reforms 
of the financial and corporate sectors, competition and governance policies and 
trade regimes.” (p.105, Box 3.2). These reforms were implemented even before   7 
the  GSI  propositions  were  fully  specified,  let  alone  verified  empirically 
(Feldstein, 1998).  
 
Even  though  the  GSI  thesis  concerning  the  Asian  crisis  has  difficulty  in 
explaining its suddenness, it can, nevertheless, be argued that a weaker form of 
the hypothesis is plausible. Thus, it could be argued that, following Morck et al, 
over  time  crony  capitalism  could  reach  a  stage  at  which  it  becomes 
counterproductive, though these authors do not provide any guidance as to how 
and why such a stage may be reached. This is very much an empirical question 
and the available facts will be reviewed below. Apart from crony capitalism, 
available evidence on a number of other relevant issues will be reviewed in 
order to assess their compatibility with the GSI critique of the Asian model of 
capitalism  or  with  Morck  et  al’s  perspective  on  the  dynamics  of  crony 
capitalism.  
 
Since the crisis, there has been an enormous amount of research on this subject, 
much  of  it  done  by  the  international  financial  institutions  themselves,  that 
provides empirical evidence on a number of issues bearing on the GSI theses. 
Below, a summary overview is provided of evidence drawn from a variety of 
countries  on  a)  the  nature  of  share-ownership  b)  ownership,  control  and 
company  performance,  c)  crony  capitalism,  d)  the  relationship  between 
corporate governance and the stock market, and e) the state of competition in 
product markets.  
 
a) Share-ownership around the world 
Research since the crisis on share-ownership around the world confirms that 
Asian corporations are more likely to be family owned, or have a concentrated 
pattern similar to that observed in many continental European countries (La 
Porta et al., 1999a). This is in contrast to the type of American corporation 
characterized  in  Berle  and  Means  (1933)  work  as  having  widely  dispersed 
share-ownership and separation of ownership from control.  
 
The family-based systems of corporate governance are often associated with 
relationship banking. A priori, there is no reason to believe that such systems 
are necessarily inferior to the arm’s length stock-market based Anglo-Saxon 
model.  Both have positive and negative features.  To the extent that the former 
systems are better able to resolve agency problems and suffer much less from 
the  short-termism  and  speculative  bubbles  associated  with  the  stock  market 
based  model,  they  are  arguably  more  conducive  to  the  long-term  economic 
development  of  emerging  countries.  Empirical  evidence  suggests  that,  under 
these systems, both emerging markets and European countries such as Italy, 
Sweden or Germany, have had successful records of fast long-term growth that   8 
is superior to those of Anglo-Saxon countries (Singh, Singh and Weisse, 2000; 
see however La Porta et al., 1999b). 
 
b) Ownership, control and performance 
How does family-ownership and control of large firms affect performance at the 
microeconomic level? A range of studies for Asian countries reviewed in Glen 
and Singh (2005) suggest a mixed picture.  On the one side Suehiro’s (2001) 
detailed study of Thai corporations indicates that the group of corporations with 
no ultimate owners (that is, widely-held firms) have the worst business record 
(in terms of a variety of indicators) of the listed companies surveyed. It will be 
recalled  that  such  companies  are  regarded  by  the  IMF  as  models  for  good 
corporate governance.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Joh  (2003)  study  of  Korean  firms  found  a  cubic 
relationship between ownership and firm profitability, controlling for firm and 
industry  characteristics.  In  other  words,  profitability  generally  increases  as 
ownership  by  controlling  families  increases.  Profitability  is  reduced  when 
ownership is either too high or too low. Joh reconciles the varied results by 
observing that the business group structure found in Asian countries is helpful at 
low levels of economic development as it allows an internal capital market to 
allocate  resources  more  efficiently  than  an  underdeveloped  external  capital 
markets.  However,  at  a  higher  level  of  development  the  advantages  of  an 
internal capital market are outweighed by those of an external market.  
 
c) Crony capitalism 
Claessens  et  al  (2000)  provide  extremely  interesting  information  on  the 
concentration of ownership by top families in 9 Asian countries in 1996. Their 
data is reproduced in Table 1. This table indicates that there are indeed a small 
number of families that control a large proportion of listed corporate assets in 
these countries. Assets as a proportion of GDP controlled by the top fifteen 
families amounted to 84.2 per cent in Hong Kong and 76.2 per cent in Malaysia. 
The data in Table 1 does broadly indicate a generally high concentration of 
control  in  leading  Asian  countries.  However,  the  important  point  is  that  the 
differences between countries that suffered economic crisis and those that did 
not is not associated with the degree of control concentration, that is, with crony 
capitalism as is conventionally measured – see further below. Thus there is no 
robust  association  between  crony  capitalism  and  financial  crisis,  let  alone  a 
causal one.  
 
It is also important to observe that high concentrations of control are not simply 
an Asian phenomenon or necessarily wholly negative in terms of overall social 
and economic welfare. By the normal empirical definition used to measure the   9 
phenomenon of crony capitalism, that is concentration of a nation’s assets held 
by  a  few  families,  Sweden,  with  almost  60  per  cent  of  industrial  assets 
controlled  by  the  Wallenberg  family,  would  be  a  prime  example  of  crony 
capitalism. This has not, however, led to the widely assumed misallocation of 
resources  through  corrupt  relationships,  or  resulted  in  economic  crisis.  This 
accords with the Morck et al (2005) analysis that elite control over assets can 
lead either to favourable or unfavourable outcomes. Whether crony capitalism 
leads to corruption or misallocation of resources is a product of the complex of 
relations  between  business  and  political  elites.  Moreover,  crony  capitalism 
could  in  principle  arise  in  systems  with  widely  dispersed  share  ownership 
(Berglof and von Thadden, 1999).   
 
d) The relationship between corporate governance and the stock market 
In orthodox analyses of corporate governance the stock market plays a central 
role. It is thought that the best way to bring about an optimal allocation of 
resources  is  for  corporations  to  maximize  shareholder  wealth  subject  to  the 
constraints of a liquid stock market. In their analysis of the East Asian crisis, the 
IMF  and  the  World  Bank  regarded  the  low  level  of  development  of  stock 
markets as a major negative feature of these countries as this obliged firms to 
raise capital from banks, normally state-owned, that led to high corporate debt-
equity ratios thereby making them vulnerable to economic shocks. However, 
contrary  to  these  prognostications,  there  is  evidence  that,  surprisingly,  large 
corporations in developing countries raise a large part of their finance on the 
stock  market,  indeed  their  reliance  on  such  finance  is  greater  than  that  of 
developed country firms (Guggler et al. 2003; Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Singh 
1995,  2003).  Furthermore,  contrary  to  the  expectations  of  the  international 
institutions, the stock markets in the emerging countries in Asia expanded at a 
historically unprecedented rate in the 1980s. Many small Asian stock markets 
achieved  the  same  level  of  market  capitalization  as  small  and  medium  size 
European  countries  (Singh  and  Weisse,  1998).  However,  whether  such 
involvement in stock markets and stock market development is helpful for the 
economy  and  for  firms  is  a  question  that  is  returned  to  in  the  next  section 
dealing with the merits of the stock-market based US business model.  
 
e) Competition in product markets 
There is very little empirical evidence on the state of competition in emerging 
markets, despite the fact that many of these economies have been following 
market  oriented  policies  of  deregulation  and  privatization  for  nearly  twenty 
years.  In  the  absence  of  hard  evidence,  there  are  different  views  among 
economists as to how intensive competition is in emerging markets (see Laffont, 
1999; De Soto, 2001; Porter and Sakibara, 2004).   
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The  small  amount  of  data  available  on  an  international  comparative  basis 
suggests that many leading developing countries have high three or four-firm 
concentration ratios compared with advanced countries (World Bank, 1993).  
On the other hand, it is also the case that developing countries tend to have a 
very large proportion of small firms employing less than ten workers. 
 
In  order  to  overcome  the  well-known  difficulties  with  static  measures  of 
concentration, Glen, Lee and Singh (2001, 2003) have used time-series analysis 
of corporate profitability in seven emerging markets to discover the dynamics 
and the intensity of competition in these economies relative to what has been 
observed  for  advanced  countries.    Both  Glen,  Lee  and  Singh  papers  have 
employed the same methodology of the persistence of profitability (PP) studies 
(pioneered by Dennis Mueller and his colleagues (1990) which has been widely 
used to study competition intensity in developed countries.   
 
Surprisingly, the results indicate that developing countries have, on the whole, 
lower persistency coefficients (λi) than those observed for advanced countries, 
even when allowance is made for the shorter time series available of corporate 
profitability for developing than for advanced countries. Further, the proportion 
of  firms  for  which  long-term  profitability  is  significantly  different  from  the 
norm,  either  in  the  positive  or  negative  directions,  is  also  much  lower  for 
developing than for advanced countries. (See Tables 2, 3 and 4) 
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Table 1: How concentrated is family control? 
 
    % of total value of listed companies 
% of 
GDP 
    that families control (1996)  1996 
Country  Average Number  Top 1  Top 5  Top 10  Top 15  Top 15 
 
of firms per 
family  families  families  families  families  families 
Hong 
Kong  2.36  6.5  26.2  32.2  34.4  84.2 
Indonesia  4.09  16.6  40.7  57.7  61.7  21.5 
Japan  1.04  0.5  1.8  2.4  2.8  2.1 
Korea  2.07  11.4  29.7  36.8  38.4  12.9 
Malaysia  1.97  7.4  17.3  24.8  28.3  76.2 
Philippines  2.68  17.1  42.8  52.5  55.1  46.7 
Singapore  1.26  6.4  19.5  26.6  29.9  48.3 
Taiwan  1.17  4  14.5  18.4  20.1  17 
Thailand  1.68  9.4  32.2  46.2  53.3  39.3 
 
Note: Newly assembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial 
and non-financial institutions). The data was collected from Worldscope and supplemented 
with  information  from  country-specific  sources.  In  all  cases,  we  collect  the  ownership 
structure as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible date. The "average number 
of firms per family" refers only to firms in the sample. To avoid discrepancies in the cross 
country  comparison  due  to  different  sample  coverage,  we  have  scaled  down  the  control 
holdings of each family group in the last four columns by assuming that the firms missing 
from our sample are not controlled by any of the largest 15 families. The percent of total 
GDP is calculated using market capitalization and GDP data from the World Bank. Source: 
Claessens et al. (2000), p.108. 
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Table 2. Developing countries: mean values of λi and proportion of 
significantly positive and significantly negative YiLR 
   Mean λi     Positive YiLR      Negative YiLR  
           
Brazil  0.013    1 / 56    3 / 56 
           
India  0.229    2 / 40    4 / 40 
           
Jordan  0.348    1 / 17    0 / 17 
           
Korea  0.323    7 / 82    2 / 82 
           
Malaysia  0.349    4 / 62    7 / 62 
           
Mexico  0.222    0 / 39    0 / 39 
           
Zimbabwe  0.421    0 / 40    4 / 40 
                 
Source:  Glen, Lee and Singh (2002) 
 
 
Table 3.  Persistence of Profitability Studies for Industrial Countries 









           
Geroski  and  Jacquemin 
(1988)  UK  1947-77  29  51  0.488 
  France  1965-82  18  55  0.412 
  Germany  1961-81  21  28  0.410 
           
Schwalbach et al. (1989)  Germany  1961-82  22  299  0.485 
           
Mueller (1990)  US  1950-72  23  551  0.183 
           
Cubbin and Geroski (1990)  UK  1948-77  30  243  0.482 
           
Khemani  and  Shapiro 
(1990)  Canada  1964-82  19  129  0.425 
           
Odagiri  and  Yamawaki 
(1990)  Japan  1964-82  19  376  0.465 
           
Schohl (1990)  Germany  1961-81  21  283  0.509 
           
Waring (1996)  US  1970-89  20  12,986  0.540 
                 
Source: Goddard and Wilson (1999)           13
Table 4.  Statistics on Long-Run Profitability: Advanced Country Corporations 
  (1)    (2) 
   Positive YiLR     Negative YiLR 
       
United Kingdom 1951-77  37  (15.2)    37   (15.2) 
(243 firms)       
       
United States 1950-72  125   (22.7)    149   (27.0) 
(551 firms)       
       
United States 1964-80  66   (16.0)    137   (33.2) 
(413 firms)       
       
Sweden 1967-85  7   (16.2)    8   (18.6) 
(43 firms)       
       
Canada 1968-82  33   (20.5)    23   (14.3) 
(161 firms)       
       
Fed. Rep. of Germany 1961-82  53   (18.3)    50   (17.2) 
(290 firms)       
       
France 1965-82  NA    NA 
(450 firms)       
       
Japan 1964-82  62   (16.5)    56   (14.9) 
(376 firms)       
           
Note: Figures in brackets are percentages.     
Source: Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990)       
 
 
Complementary evidence to that of Glen, Lee and Singh (2003) is provided by 
other research which also bears on the dynamics of the competition process but 
uses  a  different  methodology.  Studies  in  this  genre  have  recently  been 
summarized  by  Tybout  (2000)  and  Caves  (1998).  The  results  indicate  that 
compared with advanced countries there is greater mobility, as well as entry and 
exit of firms, in the small number of emerging markets for which such studies 
have been carried out. 
 
Glen,  Lee  and  Singh  (2003)  suggest  that  these  results  on  the  comparative 
intensity of competition in emerging and mature countries are wholly plausible 
in economic terms.  This is because, although there are many structural features 
of  developing  countries  and  the  policies  of  their  governments  that  are  anti-  14




The above review of research on the ownership and control of firms, on crony 
capitalism and on the intensity of competition in emerging markets indicates 
that  microeconomic  behaviour  and  corporate  structures  in  emerging  markets 
provide little evidence in support of the GSI structuralist thesis. The available 
data  on  corporate  governance  structures  in  developing  countries  does  not 
support  the  view  that  deficits  in  this  sphere  were  responsible  for  the  crisis. 
Family controlled large and small emerging market firms have been seen to be 
often more efficient than widely-held firms. Crony capitalism was as much as 
feature of the non-crisis economies as of the crisis economies. There is also 
evidence of intense competition and rivalry among firms in product markets.  
 
Here is not the place to review theories of the crisis, but it is, nevertheless, 
worth  noting  that  there  is  a  straightforward  alternative  hypothesis  which,  in 
sharp contrast to the GSI thesis above, has strong and robust evidential support.  
This hypothesis attributes the Asian crisis to precipitate financial liberalization, 
that a number of crisis-affected countries had embarked on in early the 1990s. 
Moreover, it is a fact that corporate governance and the state of competition did 
not  alter  much  before  the  crisis,  whereas  financial  liberalization  was  a  new 
phenomenon in crisis-affected countries such as Korea and Thailand.  
 
Empirical  findings  contradict  orthodox  theory  that  suggests  that  financial 
liberalization  and  new  financial  instruments  should  lead  to  consumption 
smoothing rather than crises, which has been the observed outcome of many 
episodes of financial liberalization in developing countries in recent decades 
(Kaminsky  and  Reinhardt,  1999).  The  reasons  for  the  observed  disjuncture 
between theory and reality in the context of financial liberalization are now well 
understood. The more important reasons include a) the inherent volatility of 
capital flows due to irrational exuberance or unwarranted pessimism on the part 
of  investors;  b)  increased  competition  among  banks  following  liberalization, 
leading to risk-taking and bank failures; c) the changes in the global financial 
system and the short-termism of the leading international actors.  
 
In theoretical terms, the conflict between textbook theory and reality in relation 
to financial liberalization has been explained by emphasizing the differences 
between the former and trade liberalization, that is, free trade.  The latter is 
thought to lead to a Pareto optimum allocation of resources under certain well-
known  conditions.  The  analogous  case  of  Pareto  optimality  for  financial 
liberalization  is  not  valid  because  such  liberalization  is  dominated  by   15
informational  asymmetries,  problems  of  moral  hazard,  and  adverse  selection 
among other factors. Some of these factors are also present of trade in goods but 
are not a dominant feature.  
 
In less abstract terms, the case for attributing the cause of crisis to financial 
liberalization is backed up by the experiences of India and China. These two 
countries  were  at  the  time  thought  to  be  prime  candidates  for  the  Asian 
contagion. Their corporate sectors had some of the same characteristics as those 
of crisis-affected countries. Indian corporations’ debt equity ratios were among 
the  highest  in  Asia  and  the  country  did  not  have  strong  macroeconomic 
fundamentals as compared with some of the crisis-affected countries. Yet China 
and India escaped the crisis, which suggests that one way to escape crisis is to 
maintain extensive capital controls (Singh, 2003a; Singh and Zammit, 2000).   
 
5. The US business model: a critical examination 
 
The US business model, stock markets and technology 
The  US  business  model  of  shareholder  wealth  maximization  subject  to  the 
constraints of liquid stock markets has risen from the shadow of strong criticism 
as being responsible for the sluggishness of the US economy to acclaim for 
having engineered the US lead in the information and technology revolution and 
to faster growth in the US economy. The extent to which the US corporate 
model facilitates technological dynamism is perhaps the central issue in any 
assessment of its merits.   
  
Porter  (1992)  reported  on  the  findings  of  a  US  blue  ribbon  commission 
(comprising  22  leading  US  economists  including  Larry  Summers)  on  the 
country’s business model and the associated system of allocating capital.  The 
Commission made serious criticisms of America’s capital markets, indicating 
that they were misallocating resources and jeopardizing the American position 
in the world economy. It is indeed true that the US economy stagnated between 
1973 and 1995, registering hardly any overall increase in productivity growth.  
 
However, since 1995 it is now widely acknowledged that there has been an 
increase in the US economy’s long-term rate of growth by 1 percentage point 
from 2.5 to nearly 3.5 per cent a year. This strong performance is attributed by 
leading scholars such as Jorgenson (2001, 2003) to the US lead in information 
technology. This success, in turn, is widely attributed to the pivotal role played 
by US stock markets and venture capital markets in financing this technological 
revolution. It is suggested that not all economies with stock markets are able to 
achieve these feats. Black and Gilson (1998) have argued that other advanced 
economies such as Germany have tried to imitate the US venture capital market   16
but have not been successful. The American success is due in part to its having 
a  highly  efficient  and  effective  market  for  corporate  control.  This  allows  a 
timely ‘exit option’, making it possible for the American-type venture market to 
flourish.  There are also other advantages attributed to the US stock market, as, 
for example, the widespread use of stock options in technology industries that 
bring individual’s incentives in line with corporate objectives.  
 
Larry Summers (1998a, 1999b), who in the past was critical of the short-term 
focus of the stock market, had a change of heart and was suggesting that the 
increasing stock-market pressure for performance has played a key role in the 
US economic success. Further, the huge investment in new technology firms in 
the US during the technology boom of the 1990s, despite their zero or negative 
short-term  profits,  is  regarded  as  an  obvious  refutation  of  the  short-termism 
alleged by critics of stock markets. 
 
Nevertheless, a critical examination of the functioning of the stock market in the 
last ten years, even taking into account the above facts, raises the following 
questions. Does the experience of the last decade warrant a complete reversal of 
the conclusions reached by Michael Porter and his colleagues in 1992? Does the 
so-called ‘new’ US economy constitute a conclusive proof of the superiority of 
the country’s financial system over all others’? Is there adequate analysis and 
empirical  evidence  to  indicate  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  model  of  corporate 
governance outlined above is the one that all countries, including developing 
ones, should adopt? Singh et al (2005) have carried out a detailed analysis of 
these issues and they report the following conclusions: 
 
•  The experience over the last decades in the US capital markets provides 
little justification for revising the unfavourable 1992 verdict of Michael 
Porter and his colleagues, although the reasons for this are not necessarily 
the same now as they were then. 
 
•  Instead of maximizing shareholder wealth, developing country companies 
should pay no attention to their market valuations. Rather, they should 
pursue their traditional objective of increasing market share or corporate 
growth within the overall framework of the country’s industrial policy.  
 
•  The stock-market based model of shareholder wealth maximization does 
not represent the ‘end of history’ or the epitomy of corporate law as some 
suggest. 
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The main reasons for these conclusions lie in the severe deficiencies of two 
market processes, which are central to the efficient operation of stock markets, 
first the pricing process and second the market for corporate control.  It will 
further be appreciated that the last decade of applause for the US stock market 
must at leas be tempered by the fact during this period there was not only a 
boom but also a very significant bust. The NSDAQ index of share prices of new 
technology companies is still well below half the value that it reached at its peak 
in 2000. 
 
The pricing process on the stock market 
It  will  be  observed  that  during  the  last  two  decades  the  orthodox  efficient 
markets hypothesis concerning share prices has suffered fundamental setbacks. 
This specifically due to the following events: (a) the 1987 US stock market 
crash, (b) the meltdown in the Asian stock markets in the 1990s and (c) the 
recent  bursting  of  the  technology  stocks  bubble.  Following  Tobin  (1984)  a 
useful  distinction  can  be  made  between  two  kinds  of  efficiency  of  stock 
markets. First, there is ‘information arbitrage efficiency’ (IAE) that ensures that 
all information concerning a firm’s shares immediately percolates to all stock 
market  participants,  ensuring  that  no  participant  can  make  a  profit  on  such 
public information. Second, there is ‘fundamental valuation efficiency’ (FVE), 
that is, share prices accurately reflect a firm’s fundamentals, that is, its long-
term expected profitability (Tobin, 1984). The growing consensus view is that 
stock market prices may at best be regarded as efficient in the first sense above 
(IAE),  but  are  far  from  being  efficient  in  the  economically  more  important 
second sense (FVE; Singh, 1999b) This point hardly needs labouring today in 
the light of the bust of the technology bubble in the western stock markets and 
almost two decades of stock market stagnation and decline in Japan. It will be 
difficult to preach an EMH gospel to citizens in Thailand and Indonesia who 
suffered a virtual meltdown of their stock markets during the Asian crisis.  
 
The market for corporate control 
There are good theoretical reasons as well as a large body of empirical evidence 
to  suggest  why  the  markets  for  corporate  control  in  advanced  countries, 
including the UK and the US, do not work at all well. A central point is that the 
take-over  selection  process  does  not  simply  punish  poor  performance  and 
reward good performance. The evidence indicates that selection in this market 
does not take place entirely on the basis of performance but much more so on 
the basis of size.  A large relatively inefficient firm has a greater chance of 
survival than a small efficient firm (Singh, 1992). 
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Further, there are good theoretical reasons as well as empirical evidence for 
suggesting  that  take-overs  may  lead  to  ‘short-termism’.  In  addition,  more 
broadly, they may also result in economic rewards being given for financial 
engineering  rather  than  for  entrepreneurial  effort  in  improving  products  and 
cutting costs. The take-over disciplinary process is thus seen by many to be 
arbitrary and haphazard (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Scherer, 1998; Tichy, 
2001; Singh 2000). The deficiencies of the pricing and takeover processes are 
compounded in the case of developing countries because  of their regulatory 
deficits and relative immaturity of their stock markets. Singh (1998a) argues for 
restrictions  on  the  development  of  a  market  for  corporate  control  for  these 
countries. Rather, he suggests that developing countries should find cheaper and 
less  haphazard  mechanisms  to  change  managements  than  the  above  stock 
market process. 
 
The  technology  boom,  the  mispricing  of  shares  and  the  market  for 
corporate control  
It is widely acknowledged that there was widespread mispricing of shares of 
shares during the technology boom of 1995-2000. There was also a huge over-
investment in technology companies.  Importantly, in addition to the foregoing 
there was perhaps a greater resource misallocation through the working of the 
market  for  corporate  control.  In  essence  grossly  overpriced  technology 
companies bought up underpriced old economy companies to the detriment of 
both and to the detriment of social welfare.  Jensen (2003) drew attention in this 
context to the case of Nortel, a large US company that between 1997 and 2001 
acquired 19 companies at a price of US$ 33 billion.  Many of these acquisitions 
were paid for in Nortel shares whose value had skyrocketed during that period. 
When the company’s price fell 95 per cent in the technology stock bust, all the 
acquisitions had to be written off.  Jensen observed “Nortel destroyed those 
companies  and  in  doing  so  destroyed  not  only  the  corporate  value  that  the 
acquired companies - on their own - could have generated but also the social 
value those companies represented in the form of jobs, products and services.” 
(pp.15) 
 
Although Jensen suggests various ways of reducing the mispricing of shares, in 
Keynesian analysis such mispricing is inherent in any share pricing process via 
the stock market. In this paradigm, stock market players base their investment 
decisions not on the basis of fundamentals but on speculative and gambling 
considerations.  With such pricing, shareholder wealth maximization is clearly 
not a useful objective for corporate managers who have the firm’s interest in 
view. Kay (2003) therefore rightly suggests that corporate managers should pay 
no attention to the stock market at all.  Indeed, the creation of shareholder value   19
should  not  be  a  corporate  goal.  The  Keynesian  view  of  pricing  process  is 
supported by a large body of analytical and empirical studies.
4 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper has outlined the main issues involved in assessing the comparative 
merits of the stock-market based US corporate model and that of the traditional 
Asian model, based on close cooperation between government, business and 
finance. These have been examined here from the perspective of developing 
countries.  Evidence  provides  little  support  for  the  GSI  view  that  the 
fundamental causes of the Asian crisis lay in weak corporate governance and 
poor  competitive  environment  in  these  emerging  economies.  There  is  much 
more  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  crucial  factor  was  precipitate  financial 
liberalization. This suggests that the IMF’s policy prescriptions for the crisis 
affected Asian countries involving enormous institutional changes were doubly 
unfortunate. Not only were the grounds for rejecting the Asian was of doing 
business totally inadequate, but the recommended policy of adopting essentially 
the  American  model  was  not  solidly  grounded  (Stiglitz,  1999).  A  reformed 
Asian  model  that  extended  also  to  labour  and  other  social  groups  the 
cooperation between business and government would much more likely to be 
conducive to economic development and broad-based social welfare than the 





















   20
 
Notes 
1 The Financial Times reported on February 20 1998 that in the less than eight 
month period from 1 July 1997 to 18 February 1998 Indonesia for example 
suffered a more that 80 per cent fall in share prices and an almost 75 per cent 
fall in the value of the currency against the US dollar.   
2 Thus the then US Treasury Secretary Rubin coined the phrase “the new 
international financial architecture” to signal the desirability of international 
financial reform to forestall future crises. See further Singh, Singh and Weiss, 
2003.   
3 See further, Glen and Singh (2004, 2005). The present paper is a sequel to 
Glen and Singh (2005). It also draws upon other papers by Ajit Singh and by 
Ajit Singh in collaboration with others (Singh, 2003; Singh et al 2005).  
4 Earlier reviews of this literature are contained in Camerer (1989) and Journal 
of  Economic  Perspectives  (1990).  For  a  more  comprehensive  list  of  recent 
references  see  footnote  19  of  Singh  (1997).  For  the  latest  contributions  and 
assessments see for example Shiller (2000) and Shleifer (2000).   21
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